Ethnic relations is the world's most easily exploitable topic for kindling passions to aggravate the public situation, should one want such an outcome. In post-Soviet territory this is one of the major issues.

Civil peace and relative stability, in experts’ unanimous opinion, are the main achievements of independent Ukraine. Unfortunately, the presidential campaign of 2004 in Ukraine was characterized by uncompromised struggle between two main candidates – Victor Yanukovich (presenting authorities) and Victor Yuschenko (presenting the national-democratic opposition). Their struggle was so tense that one could get an impression that not only the political career of the candidates or the property of their closest entourage was at stake, but their very freedom and even life (in fact, many participants in the political processes believed and continue to believe just that). The presidential campaign demonstrated that for many involved in this fight the goal justified the means. In order to achieve the desired results, some candidates and their experts in PR and political technologies embarked on, to put it mildly, unethical and unsafe exploitation of the problems of ethnic relations in the country. In addition, in the development of their “schemes”, the analytics and “directors” of election campaigns did not only draw attention to the realistically existing problems, but also artificially invigorated them and with the assistance of many cunning multi-step tricks tried to create new sources of tensions or stir up those that seemed to be healing.

This article is specifically devoted not to anti-Semitism per se in the course of that campaign, but to the analysis of the election technologies that exploited the “Jewish question” one way or another.

To put it briefly, I can say that on the general republican scale, the national question was used within the framework of the “black” PR campaign against Yuschenko. The “directors” of the election campaign developed a simple concept. There are less electors living in the west of Ukraine than in the east. The west of the country speaks Ukrainian, while the east speaks Russian. The west of Ukraine hates communists and Russia, while the east hates “Bandera” gangs and America. So, the candidate who wants to win the elections must mainly win the support of the east. His political technology must be focused on imposing the associative connection between his rival and the west. Thus, his victory will be won due to the simple proportion of the population of Ukraine’s different regions. Victor Yanukovich could easily win the support of the east of the country, in the opinion of his political technologists, due to the facts of his biography and exploitation of the regional Donbass patriotism, as well as with the assistance of symbolic gestures towards the Russian language, the canonical Orthodox Church, and Russia herself. He only had to impose upon his opponent the reputation of a “west-supporter” (in spite of the fact that Victor Yuschenko was born closer to the current border with Russia than Victor Yanukovich), who can count only on the support of the “Bandera gang” bought with the American dollars. Should he, through the mass media, manage to persuade the society of this situation, the victory of the pro-authorities candidate could have been automatic.

On the national scale, during the campaign the pro-presidential mass media were forming the images of Victor Yuschenko and Yulia Timoshenko as national radicals. They were trying to impose the following dichotomy on the society: “regressive agrarian west – Bandera gang – nationalists – USA – Yuschenko” against “progressive industrial east – Russian speakers – winners over the fascism – Russia – Yanukovich”. No doubt, from the viewpoint of those political technologists who developed this scheme, the imposed reputation of Yuschenko as a part of the “Bandera gang” absolutely was to include ultra-nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. They even came up with the term “nashism”, which comes from the name of Yuschenko’s bloc “Nasha Ukraina” (“Our Ukraine”) and which rhymes with “fascism”. One should admit that Yuschenko’s bloc was formed hastily on the very eve of the parliamentary elections in spring 2002 and it did include some marginal national radicals. However, despite the presence of certain radicals and xenophobes in the camp of the national-democratic opposition (even the leftist opposition, including the Socialists who supported the candidacy of Yuschenko between the rounds, have enough of their own anti-Semites), one cannot look at the opposition on a whole as “fascist”, anti-Semitic, and chauvinistic. The loudest and most radical statements in support of Yuschenko on behalf of the national radicals who spoke from anti-Semitic and Russian-phobic positions, were also part of the prevocational anti-Yuschenko campaign.

The image of Yuschenko as an anti-Semite (or a man who bears with the anti-Semitism of his entourage, or even a man who is not strong enough in condemning anti-Semitism) fitted well with the general pattern of his image as a “fascist member of the Bandera gang” shaped by the pro-presidential mass media.

The exploitation of the “Jewish question” in the context of the election campaign was most obvious in the case of the “Silski Visti” newspaper.

In the falls of 2002 and 2003, the “Silski Visti” newspaper, which is close to the Socialist Party of Ukraine, published (for money but without the mark of a commercial material which is necessary for advertisements) two articles written by Professor of the Interregional Academy of Personnel Management (IAPM), Director of the Institute of Cultorological and Ethnic-Political Research under the IAPM, Vasily Yaremenko. These articles presented fragments from Yaremenko’s book “Jews in Ukraine Today: Reality Without Myths”. These materials were totally based on the idea of a Jewish plot. The International Anti-Fascist Committee filed a lawsuit against the editorial board of the “Silski Visti” newspaper in connection with Yaremenko’s publications. On January 28, 2004, the Shevchenkovsky district court of Kiev, chaired by Judge Irina Saprykina, announced the decision to close the newspaper.

The editorial board complained to the Court of Appeals of Kiev. The first hearing of the court took place in May 2004. And only on November 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals of Kiev ruled the judgment of the district court as invalid and ungrounded and returned the case to the second examination.

Some details of the campaign against this newspaper show that this case is part of a political scheme whose purpose is to discredit the oppositional coalition.

As was noted before, Vasily Yaremenko is Professor of the IAPM, and the Academy had paid for his publications in the newspaper.

Starting from spring 2002, IAPM and its president Georgy Schekin personally launched aggressive propaganda against Zionism and the State of Israel, which is still under way and which has turned into the loudest anti-Semitic campaign in the history of the post-Soviet Ukraine. The authors of IAPM’s publications call to fight against Zionism, which they come to identify with Nazism and which, in their opinion, poses a threat to the whole human race. Their arguments to “unmask” Zionism are drawn from the arsenals of the wildest anti-Semites.

IAPM’s anti-Semitic propaganda is not restricted with the pages of its “Personnel” magazine (which was started in February 2002) and the “Personnel Plus” newspaper (which was started in December 2002). The Academy is establishing ties with foreign anti-Semites (Russian, Middle-Eastern, and western, for instance, with one of the leaders of the American racists David Duke). It organizes events, publishes books which “unmask the world’s evil” of Zionism and accuses the Jews of Ukraine and worldwide of all kids of crimes. A circle of propagandists that specialize in anti-Semitism has formed itself within and around the Academy.

As a result of the story with publications of Yaremenko’s anti-Semitic articles paid for by IAPM, neither the Academy, which published Yaremenko’s book and paid for the publication of his articles in the newspaper, nor the author were punished. The newspaper alone suffered. Many political observers insisted that the authorities took advantage of this cause to close an oppositional newspaper (or that this cause was created on purpose, as a result of this provocation). Thus, the whole bloc of oppositional forces, Socialists in particular, were discredited – by their protests against the closing down of a popular large paper they gave reasons to be accused of anti-Semitism by the pro-authorities mass media. I would think that IAPM played the role of a provocator in the story with “Silski Visti”.

“Silski Visti” is an unofficial publication of the Socialist Party. The paper lashed against the president and the government. It also printed articles by other oppositional forces. Victor Yuschenko certainly said that the paper must master courage and ask forgiveness from those people whose ethnic feelings were offended by those publications. But he admitted that the closing down of the paper is not an adequate measure. However, these dirty publications threw shadow on the whole opposition which was represented by Yuschenko. The authorities used the situation with the paper in order to discredit the opposition at large. It is obvious that in this case the point at issue was not so much the striving to punish anti-Semitic propaganda (just note that IAPM’s publications, which are the first source of these materials, continue to be printed and distributed without prohibition), but to use ethnic problems in election purposes. With due regard to everything said above, one must not exclude that Yaremenko’s articles were originally palmed off upon “Silski Visti” with the purpose of provocation. The editorial board yielded to it, which by no means counts in their favor, - and paid for it.

The fact that IAPM caused a provocation in the situation with “Silski Visti” is indirectly proved by the court proceedings that looked into the case “IAPM Against Joseph Zisels”. Chairman of the Vaad of Ukraine, Chairman of the General Council of the Euroasian Jewish Congress Joseph Zisels in an interview to the “Inter” TV channel expressed the opinion that the activities of the Academy cause a lot of provocations in order to accuse certain political forces of anti-Semitism. IAPM filed a lawsuit for protection of business reputation to the Pechersky district court of Kiev. On June 22, 2004, the court rejected the Academy’s claims.

The situation with the “Silski Visti” paper was intensively developed by the pro-presidential mass media with the purpose of adding information to the shaped image of Yuschenko as part of the “Bandera gangs”. Within the framework of the same scheme, during the election campaign, the TV channels loyal to the previous authorities actively quoted the anti-Semitic statements by Verkhovna Rada deputy, Oleg Tyagnybok, who was part of the “Nasha Ukraina” faction. One should note that for his anti-Semitic statements, Tyagnybok was immediately expelled from the faction. He had never been one of Yuschenko’s close entourage (unlike many active figures of the Jewish community, for example, vice president of the Euroasian Jewish Congress Yevgeny Chervonenko, who became the transportation minister in the new Ukrainian government), and his position has nothing in common with the position of the overwhelming majority of Yuschenko’s supporters. While leading the opposition, Yuschenko was in close cooperation with Jewish organizations and communities of other ethnic minorities. The “Nasha Ukraina” faction and the Congress of National Communities of Ukraine have signed an agreement on cooperation. I can quote a lot of other examples of Victor Yuschenko’s consistent tolerant attitude to ethnic minorities. However, the logic of the anti-Yuschenko information campaign which accompanied the election campaign, did not depend on the real situation, but on ideas of cynical “political advisability”. Control of the supporters of the former president and prime minister over the main mass media made it possible for them to form the “picture” which had nothing in common with the real facts.

In this situation, Tyagnybok alone was insufficient to form an information field. So, just as in the case with “Silski Visti”, Yuscheno’s opponents put forward the political forces that they had prepared in advance. One of the organizations claiming to be the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian National Self-Defense (leader – Eduard Kovalenko) held out a number of events allegedly in support of Yuschenko but under anti-Semitic and anti-Russian slogans (“Jews, Get Out of Power!”, “Kikes and Russians are Enemies of Ukraine”, etc.). The situation was even more complicated because leader of another part of UNA-UNSO, Andrey Shkil, who is closer to the mild national-democratic position, did take active part in Yuschenko’s election campaign.

On June 26, 2004, UNA-UNSO (Kovalenko) organized a march along Kreschatik in support of Yuschenko. In the course of the march, young people wearing black uniform, fascist-like symbols (SSS, UNSO-type cross and a three-point star rounded like swastika) and showing a certain gesture with their right hands, actively demonstrated their love to the oppositional candidate. All of this was accompanied with national-radical, anti-Semitic, and anti-Russian demonstrations. Later, similar actions took place in the regions. The mass media gave a wide coverage to Kovalenko’s events. In the opinion of political observers, the actions of UNA-UNSO (Kovalenko) were organized by the Social Democrats (united) and the then leader of the presidential administration, Victor Medvedchuk, all of whom supported Victor Yanukovich.

Yuschenko’s headquarters immediately described these events as a provocation. According to Yuschenko himself, young people were paid forty grivnas each for participation in these events. “A few days ago I turned to Kovalenko’s leadership with the request to bestow such support not on me but rather on the candidates from the authorities or on Medvedchuk”, Yuschenko said, and added, “For three years I have been denied permission to have a demonstration in Kreschetik, while rascals with fascist symbols have no problem getting it”. The headquarters of Yuschenko found it extremely hard to explain that it was a “different” UNA-UNSO.

In this case, the pattern “fascists for Yuschenko” becomes clear and fits well the black PR campaign, whose classic example was the Russian campaign “homosexuals for Yavlinsky”. A bit more complicated – and I believe more dangerous – is the role of some “technical candidates” who exploited ethnic rhetoric in elections.

Although twenty-three candidates ran for the presidential office, only two of them could realistically claim it. All the participants in the election process realized it, that is why actions of many political leaders, including those who took direct part in the election race, were largely done not to fulfill their own political program, but to support one of the favorites in the campaign; without due regard for this factor, their actions cannot be properly understood. Moreover, the very naming and independent participation in the presidential elections of some of the candidates was only the means of “helping” the election campaign of one of the race leaders. Political commentators called such candidates as “technical” ones, so we will continue operating this term here.

Two factors prompted the participation of “technical candidates” in the race. First, consistuent and territorial election commissions were formed of representatives of all candidates, that is why if one of the parties wanted to control the actions of the whole commission (for instance, in order to foil the signing of the summary protocol should the outcome of the elections in this particular constituency does not please it), it should “only” initiate the naming and registration of enough “pocket”, well-controlled “technical candidates”. Since this side of the question is purely technological, we will not draw a lot of attention to it. However, apart from representatives in election commissions, presidential candidates, among other things, are entitled to free time on TV and radio as well as other opportunities for propaganda. Technical candidates did not only make machinations with vote count possible, but also helped the pro-authorities candidate make some propaganda statements on behalf of someone else. Although not every formal participant in the election race was involved in any obvious propaganda, some of them played an important role in the general anti-Yuschenko campaign in their localities. “Technical” candidates were used both for direct propaganda against one of the favorites and within the framework of more delicate “schemes”.

As we have already seen, one of the most aggressively exploited schemes implied the building of strict associative connections with the following heterogeneous elements: Victor Yuschenko – “west-supporters” – fascists – Bandera gang – anti-Semites – anti-Russians, etc. Some of these “technical” candidates dealt with the “knitting together” of different knots of this “network” so that an outsider would get the full picture of the needed nature. Let us note one more thing: all the anti-Semitic statements on behalf of nationalistic politicians that took place in the election race, came only from some “technical” candidates who were controlled by the political technologists working for Victor Yanukovich (such as Roman Kozak and Vladimir Nechiporuk).

The role of technical candidates from the viewpoint of direction of social events within the framework of the exploitation of the “Jewish question” boiled down approximately to the following idea. They discredited Yuschenko either directly – by the odious form of their support – or indirectly – by the very fact of their presence in the political arena. They launched nationalistic, anti-Semitic, and anti-Russian slogans into the informational space, while in the general context of black PR their echoes accompanied Yuschenko, since political technologists had one purpose in mind – creation of an a well-defined associative connection in the mind of ordinary people: Bandera-supporter Yuschenko with his fascists”. Another group of technical candidates (for instance, Alexander Bazilyuk and Natalia Vitrenko) stubbornly insisted on the idea that Yuschenko=fascism and fascism=Yuschenko. Thus, they were setting up an informational context where any chauvinistic statement, be it from a real supporter of Yuschenkio (like Tyagnybok) or a provocator, it would always associate with Yuschenko.

Anti-Semitism in itself certainly took only a small part of the general informational macrotext spearheaded at the feeding of hysteria about the “fascist threat” allegedly coming from Victor Yuschenko and his supporters. But with the little efforts spent on the actualization of the Jewish question – compared, for instance, with the exploitation of the Russian question or the question of Crimean Tatars – this political technology within the framework of the campaign also played its negative role.

Unfortunately, some political technologies used against Yuschenko in the course of the election race, launched dangerous phantoms into the informational space in order to form negative associations with the oppositional candidate. Some of these dangerous phantoms included anti-Semitism. Today, the new authorities will have to deal with the aftermath of these irresponsible actions of political technologists which cause well-grounded concern among the leaders of the Jewish community of Ukraine.