Vyacheslav Likhachev, well-known international expert on issues of far right movements and minority rights, kindly accepted the offer of 112 International to present his opinion concerning activity of far right movements in Europe. In his exclusive interview, Vyacheslav unveils the causes and details of rise of popularity of far right politicians in the EU and their connection with the Russian authorities.

Many observers state about the renaissance of the far right in Europe - referring to results of the elections in France, Hungary, to the same "Golden Dawn" in Greece, and so on. As researcher of the problem, what main causes of this can you name?

Each country has its own specific reasons. If you generalize across the whole Europe, there are two main points that determine the growth of the far right in recent years. On the one hand, it’s growth of Eurosceptic attitudes and crisis of united Europe as the political idea, on the other – it’s spread of migrant-phobic and Islamophobic sentiments among the population. It happens against the background of real migration, social, and demographic processes and in connection with the recent crisis in the Middle East. Growth in the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe from Syria and other countries raises the fear and rejection of the share part of European population.

And if we talk about the rise of not just the far right, but the very neo-Nazi movements, like the "Golden Dawn", how Euroscepticism comes in conjunction with this and encourages such things?

"Golden Dawn" is the most radical of the modern European parliamentary ultra-right parties, perhaps the only one that can truly be called the neo-Nazi one.

Greece is still quite the specific case, because of the gravity of economic situation and problems in relations with Europe. But, after all, the common point for all European countries is that the nationalists are worried that the EU member countries delegate part of their national sovereignty to supranational pan-European structures. In the case of Greece, in the perception of people, heightened by economic crisis, it is refracted as dictate of the EU, which forces to pay debts, accumulated as a result of the Union’s previous policy.

These general framing motives are common; they just multiplied by the specificity and complexity of the situation. And Greece is also the country with severe social and migration crisis, which stimulates the high level of migrant-phobia. The "Golden Dawn" was directly involved into the number of acts of violence against migrant workers in previous years, so this connection is quite transparent in this case.

Regarding migrants. Earlier this topic was permanently present, but we saw the high tide of refugees this summer. Could this push to the further radicalization of the far right?

I am afraid that it will lead to further increase of their popularity. The problem must be understood in the complex: on the one hand, this is a dramatic increase in the number of refugees because of war in Syria, on the other hand, intensification of jihadist movements in Europe is very possible. The latter manifested itself in a number of high-profile terrorist attacks - in France, in Belgium, in other countries.

There is no clear direct connection, but these processes are parallel. The influx of refugees, for sure, is related to strengthening of the "Islamic State" in Libya and Iraq, and propaganda of this and other structures causes activation of terrorism in Europe.

For an average European, these processes are mixed, and people perceive the influx of refugees as a threat of radical jihadist terrorist elements’ penetration. The simplest thing that appears in mind in this situation - they must be kept away from the country, it is necessary to be tougher to them. This is exactly what the far right politicians offer.

 

There is a set of complex factors, unique in every separate case. On the one hand it is undeniable that Kremlin is funding a number of far-right groups from Hungary to France, this is the documented data. The Kremlin is interested in the growth of the far right in Europe. Firstly, because they are Eurosceptic, and Kremlin does not want to confront Europe as a whole, it is more convenient to deal with each individual country.

On the other hand, there is a very sincere sympathy of the extreme right to Kremlin, because the latter in their view implements a kind of their anti-American conservative utopia. Putin, who firmly acts against his own terrorists-jihadists, who prevents all sorts of "debauchery" and rampant of human rights of different minorities, unacceptable to the conservative mind, who builds the sovereign orthodox conservative empire - this image is very attractive for European far-right, it effects their ideological aspirations. This is in tune with their conservative, somewhat archaic (partly religious, partly imperial) ideological project.

Also, very "cool" is that Putin does not take into consideration any international rules, and acts according to his understanding of national interests. It is a dream for any far-right politician.

In addition, Putin is in a tough confrontation with America, and this fuels sympathy to him, because anti-American feelings are also something that largely feeds ultra-right attitudes in Europe.

Can it be stated, basing on the results of the local elections that Ukrainian far right forces (for example, "Svoboda") return to their electoral positions?

I am cautious about the assertion that the right-wing policies are again the part of political mainstream. Firstly, there is no final information on the elections’ results in the nationwide scale yet to be able to compare it with previous campaigns, taking into account turnout rates and absolute number of votes.

Now, according to preliminary data, "Svoboda" got very unbalanced results - they dramatically lost votes in areas that were their electoral base. Compared to 2010, level of their support halved in Lviv and Ternopil regions, but it increased in central and before peripheral for them regions as Khmelnytsky or Kyiv... It is still difficult to interpret, these figures are to be refined, but the countrywide result, compared to 2010 local elections, when it became clear for the first time that "Svoboda" may cross the electoral threshold, is unlikely to reach 5%.

This is a general trend that has been observed for two years, last year's elections for example, that "Svoboda" is losing its support as the parliamentary party. Matter the political context and presence of competitors in every case.

Generally, these local elections have a very different agenda than parliamentary ones. Among the major issues of this election is the loss of public support to the government parties: "Narodnyi front" [party of PM Yatsenyuk] suffered the heaviest drop (in fact, it ceased to be - the government received all negativity associated with the severe economic situation and disappointment from the lack of any real reform, and victories on battlefield in the eyes of society), and the president's party lost not so much, that is interesting enough.

It is difficult to extrapolate these results to the next parliamentary elections - they will take place not soon, and the agenda can greatly change. We see how it has changed over the last year. "Svoboda" in this case was perceived as some alternative, especially if comparing to the baseline regions where it is already known for a long time. Lviv showed a great disappointment in this party. But it’s different about wavering regions, where people are looking for alternatives to the authorities...

In the east, such role was played by "Opposition Bloc" and other repainted offspring of the Party of Regions. In the center, people are not ready to vote for the latter yet, but one of the problems of post-Maidan Ukrainian politics is that a large number of new faces, civil society activists, who carried out the revolution, could not develop a suitable platform to develop party brands, could not move from public activity to political representation. If these projects were more successful, the voter would vote for them, but they are still unknown to the general public.

The voter is aware of the current authorities and the previous. People are not ready to vote for them, the current is losing support, and "Svoboda" is always at hand as a protest vote collector.

What role in this was played by the involvement of "Svoboda" to the events under the Verkhovna Rada on August 31, when the explosion of combat grenade killed four servants of the National Guard, and more than 100 were injured? The authorities, in particular Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, directly accused "Svoboda" and Tyahnybok personally in what happened, a number of party members were arrested, criminal prosecution opened against them. How did that affect the level of support of the nationalists?

Another factor of popularity of "Svoboda", crucial for understanding the political context of elections is factor of ATO. There is a certain percentage of the population (and it is considerable), which is dissatisfied with the fact of signing of the Minsk Agreement, these people believe this is defeatism and treason.

People really do not understand why it was necessary to start the anti-terrorist operation, in order to lose so many lives and so many resources, stop and say, "OK, we return this to the terrorists." Indeed, it is unclear why this war was necessary, and why the authorities did not negotiate with Putin, as of May last year, after the presidential election. There is certain dissatisfaction with the military situation and the behavior of the government regarding this.

Also, there is the factor of active participation of the ultra-right volunteer units, in fact, exaggerated very much. Purely from a military point of view, the role of the volunteer units is commonly exaggerated - the main burden of the war fell on the shoulders of the regular army.

Even at the beginning of ATO?

At the beginning of ATO, volunteer formations have played an important mobilizing role and multiplier-effect by the very fact of their existence. From a military point of view - yes, there was a month or two of oscillations, when volunteer units were the ones who went forward regardless of who and how sabotaged in the headquarters. This played a role. It was the psychological role - forming perception of the situation in the east as a real war, aggression, which should be reflected.

From a purely military point of view, the volunteer units, of course, had the successes, but also they faced quite heavy, brutal failures. I'm not going to judge those responsible for the Ilovaisk tragedy, but there was a number of situations, when volunteer formations failed to coordinate with the army staff, and this led to unjustified losses.

Obligations to liberate Donetsk, Luhansk, Crimea ... Taganrog, Rostov, anything else - that's nice for the voters to hear, especially frustrated by this situation of de facto admitted defeat. The large part of the territory is cut off, while the government presents the stop of firing as its own achievement. OK, shooting is stopped, but our territory continues to be occupied.

I must say that "Svoboda" is not the best in use of this theme in their propaganda, "Pravyi Sektor" is far more successful, and it was illustrated very well by the opinion polls over the last year since the parliamentary elections. Then the "Pravyi Sektor" as the party got the miserable result, but during the last year, from poll to poll, it stepped up his popularity due to the fact that among all political brands it is primarily associated with the ATO.

"Svoboda" has become particularly active in recent months in using the ATO issue in order to recall about itself and to attack the government. "Pravyi Sektor" did not participate in the latest election. Considering the result of "Svoboda", we must remember that there were no competitors in the right-wing niche.

To understand what "Svoboda" is by itself or in a set of several nationalist parties, we can recall the results of the 2006 and 2007 elections. In the first case, "Svoboda" received the miserable percent, but on the 2007 extraordinary parliamentary elections, "Svoboda" was the only nationalist party on the ballot, and they collected the voices of more or less radical nationalists. They doubled the result of the previous year, when it was the UNA and other right-wing conservative parties. This is one and a half percent, but the fact is that "Svoboda" picks up the voices of people who may not have voted for it, if they had an alternative.

It would be interesting to see the results of local elections if they involved "Pravyi Sektor". I think that "Svoboda" would get fewer votes than "Pravyi Sektor", at least we can state this basing on the results of polls. Now I would not extrapolate the situation for the next parliamentary elections, I do not think that "Svoboda" is now sharply increased in popularity. It now collected not only the right-wing electorate, but generally dissatisfied with the situation at the frontline. And we have a lot of such people.

This is the point to which the authorities should pay attention, I think that it will be exploited in the next election by all who will take part in them, even by the moderate national -democratic parties.

Yes, on the one hand, it can be stated that the tragedy near the Verkhovna Rada on August 31 and other actions of "Svoboda" are provocation and undermining the government’s authority in the war time, and thus this party was confidently and consistently losing its electorate. But in this particular situation, people voted for those who do not agree with the government's position on the war.

So you think that "Pravyi Sektor" has some better prospects for the future nationwide campaign? Does this party have a chance to go to the next convocation of the Verkhovna Rada?

If we look on the tendencies, recorded by ideological polls, at least it can be argued that "Pravyi Sektor " had some higher results than in the previous parliamentary elections. According to recent polls, it was on the verge of electoral barrier. It might be explained by the fact that in the political sense "Pravyi Sektor" could "privatize" the brand of the ATO participant. They have "monetized" their participation in the ATO to the political popularity.

It is quite difficult to say about the future, because the situation is changing rapidly. It is impossible to say whether the relative calm that we are seeing now in the East, will be long. Or whether Kremlin and its puppets want to aggravate the situation.

It is hardly believable that the government wants to resume ATO, taking into consideration the economic and political situation. But on the other hand, worsening of the situation is quite certain. The question is the scale, the time, and how the political situation in Ukraine. If everything goes like it is going now, "Pravyi Sektor" has better prospects than "Svoboda". If the first does not overcome the electoral threshold, then they may have more deputies in majority districts, I think. But the situation is changing rapidly, and within a few years if there is no resumption of hostilities, this agenda will cease to be relevant – as Transdniestria has ceased to be a political factor in the vote in Moldova. The political parties have got some new markers, some other issues, of European integration for example. Similar scenario might happen in Ukraine. In the case of freezing a situation, the issue of ATO would go to the background of the public discourse. Some other moments would seem far more significant.

For example, the relative popularity of the "Batkivshchyna" party is a matter of utility tariffs, Lyashko Radical Party, a little less successful than in the presidential election (when they tried to gain the popularity through the ATO issues), now it also plays in the protests against the tariffs. It means that the agenda changes and it is difficult to predict something for the next few years.

 

We all know that there are far rights both on the Ukrainian side and Russian (on the militants’, to be exact). You have written in your blog that the far rights are represented among militants even much more than at the Ukrainian side. Please, explain in several theses your position on this issue for our readers.

The real situation and the picture recorded in the media formulate different proportions of participation of the far rights at the battlefield. They participated there on the both sides; it is natural for them as the nationalists - firstly, violent behavior patterns and games with weapons. As Yarosh stated, "I feel comfortable at war, I have been preparing for it for twenty years", such as the Russian National Bolshevik Party has been preparing for this war for twenty years. Secondly, it is natural for them to protect their national interests - in general, their participation there is absolutely natural, it would be strange if they were not there.

From the European countries, however, also came the far rights, to the both sides of the front.

From the European side it was mostly exotic, which was important for propaganda pictures, but had no effect on the actual course of action. If we talk about the propagandist picture, the media more often pay attention to the participation of the far rights on the Ukrainian side of the frontline, firstly because in Ukraine there is a free press, there is a discussion of these issues, there are groups who have expressed their concern and outrage about this issue.

Attention of international observers is focused at Ukraine. What is the point to criticize the "DPR" for the fact that some of its divisions use swastikas in their emblems? Who is there to be criticized? It's like criticizing "Hamas" for human rights violations in the Middle East conflict. "Hamas" is just "Hamas", "DPR" is just "DPR." For Ukraine, which, at least declare willingness to meet European standards, in this sense, fit the other measure. Therefore, not only in Ukrainian, but also international media frequently sounded on the participation of Ukrainian right-wing radical on this side of the front. On the other side there is no free press, no international observers who could investigate international crimes like Amnesty International did in Ukraine with regard to Aidarbattalion. Access to this information is simply closed, and it is very difficult to collect even basic information that was discussed.

But, in my opinion, at the battlefield, the Russian far-right side in Donbas played significantly more important role than the Ukrainian. First of all, at the militants’ side, the share of volunteers is much higher. The Russian army has played an important role in the beginning of the conflict at the level of individual specialists, organizers, and saboteurs, not all of them have been formally Russian servants. The Russian army massively intervened in the critical moments of ATO, but it is not a permanent factor that would unite most of the fighters at that side. Most of them are volunteers. The ratio of local and Russian volunteers is very difficult to be calculated exactly, I think there is near one third Russians, two thirds locals. The latter are the extras, and the Russians are participants of professional sabotage and reconnaissance assault groups. They are highly motivated, and among them radical nationalists constitute the significant part, perhaps - more than half.

Russian neo-Nazis have played an important catalytic role in the beginning of the conflict in Donbas, because they have already been organized into paramilitary groups, mentally and physically tuned to the fact that this conflict may go through military means. In the words of Igor Strelkov [leader of militants, "Minister of Defence of the DPR" in 2014], if his unit had not seized Slavyansk, the situation would have ended up like in Kharkiv and Odesa, with the militants crushed.

If Strelkov’s group espoused “imperialist nationalism”, the group which seized Kramatorsk, "Wolf Hundred" of the Terek Cossacks, was made up to a great extent of neo-Nazis, as well as some other professional sabotage and assault groups as "Rusich", who worked in Batman’s brigade. It was a totally neo-Nazi unit, using swastikas on its emblems, and they were professional, had just served in the army or even formally terminated the contract, not soldiers, but the people who had just yesterday been Russian soldiers.

An interesting case was (it is the individual story, but rather typical) on Anton Rayevskiy, Russian neo-Nazi, who was first arrested for organizing subversive activities in Odesa in April of the last year, expelled from the country, and then went down to Ukraine already with a gun in his hand and on the armor of a tank. He retired to the reserve shortly before the events in their own right-wing circles he had a firm reputation of special services’ agent.

We have a lot of individual facts that are added to the overall picture - when we discover in Donbas people with right-wing radical background, either staying wanted in Russia or under criminal prosecution. Or, as in the case of a Russian nationalist from Murmansk, who fled to Ukraine and asked for asylum here. He was one of the leaders of Russian neo-Nazis in Murmansk, the organizer of "Russian March", held on the criminal case of violence against the native of Uzbekistan. He was invited last spring to the Federal Security Service and faced an alternative - either new criminal cases are opened regarding him, or he is engaged in recruiting and sending volunteers to Donbas as a local coordinator of the Russian National Unity.

RNU is forgotten now, but it was one of the major neo-Nazi organizations in Russia in the 1990s - early 2000s, which has strong links with the FSS and has taken a very active part in the events in Donbas. Gubarev is a member of RNU. The Russian National Unity was one of the first organizations that started to send groups to Eastern Ukraine, and, according to our data, in Donetsk, Odesa, several cities of Odesa region, groups of RNU were present since the last days of February 2014.

Same Gubarev, as far I know, is local, from Donetsk? That is, the representation of RNU was in the Donbas even before the events?

Representation of the Russian National Unity in Donbas existed, but it has not been active in recent years. It was a situation of "sleeping agents", which is used in Russia. In recent years, there was no information about Barkashov [leader and founder of RNU], he was "a political pensioner." Again he, like many, was on the crest of a wave now as Kozitsyn, Ataman of the "Great Don Army", which was very actively involved to the events in Donbas, and he personally called Surkov as his supervisor. In his office, there is a portrait of Surkov, and Kozitsyn says, "This is our gray cardinal. I really like how this team works, what they’ve decided - implement everything. "

There are many people who have been involved in the criminal or extremist parapolitical activity in Russia in the 1990s, like the same Barkashov. They recently have been convicted, they are on the "hook" of the security services, and in the last year and a half they were "reactualized". Now they have an opportunity to wash their sins before the homeland with blood (the more so because it suits their ideological beliefs) - there is a lot of such cases.

The last question is more politically general: how do you assess the prospects of the Minsk process? Would it be completed this year or in 2016? Is it a frozen conflict or "neither war nor peace"?

The situation at the ATO zone depends on one particular person who sits in Kremlin. In such cases, I say that I am not a taxi driver to know what Putin wants: every taxi driver will tell you what he wants, but I won’t.

It seems to me that it depends on Russia's participation in the war in Syria, which is conceived (at least by Russians) as an attempt to re-enter the international community under guise of "a decent man". This is bargaining for Ukraine.

Judging by the reaction of the international community, this position is not very good. Syria just cannot replace Ukraine. Firstly, the war in Syria is even more deplorable for Russian budget than the war in Donbas, and almost as much as the maintenance of Crimea. The situation in the Russian economy continues to deteriorate, and these trends are associated with global processes, the prices for hydrocarbon energy resources, and sanctions against Russia, which continues to ruin it.

I'm afraid that this is not a situation where the deterioration in the economy will force Russia to abandon the imperialist ambitions which are too expensive for the budget. The price for oil is falling, but it wouldn’t reach the level of 1992, it is unlikely to fall. The complete collapse of the Russian economy in the early 1990s did not prevent the country from getting into the war in Transdnistria, Georgia, Armenia, or Tajikistan. I believe that there are enough weapons of the Soviet era in Russia’s warehouses in Russia to supply another fifteen Donbases. They have enough Kalashnikov rifles, and old tanks in order to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence at the expense of leverage through Donbas. It’s just too tempting to refuse.

Another tempting thing is to keep the Russian people before TV screens, in a tense or sympathy to the crucified boy; make him forget about the prices, salaries, and the ruble exchange rate. Now the Russian electorate switched on Syria, admires the successful foreign policy in the global arena. But this electorate also could be dramatically switched back when needed.

In short, I am a pessimist in this sense. In some time, Kremlin will aggravate the situation in the Donbas. It is hard to predict the exact time. Maybe, in the spring, when the people will get bored with the Syrian agenda, or perhaps later. Unfortunately, I see no other way out of the spiral, in which Putin sends Russia, except of keep falling into it. I am afraid that Donetsk and Ukraine in this sense will remain victims of the Kremlin's ambitions for a long time.